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I. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

This topic was last surveyed in 1993.1 Cases and statutory changes
addressed in the current survey generally cover the period from 1994 through
the first half of 1996.
* A.B., 1962, Duke University; LL.B., 1964, University of Florida. Rohan Kelley practices
with the firm of Rohan Kelley, P.A., in Fort Lauderdale, where his practice is limited to trusts and
estates and fiduciary litigation. Florida Bar Probate Rules Committee, 1982 to present; CoChairman, 1984-88; Florida Bar Certification Committee for Wills, Estates and Trusts, 1985--86;
Chairman, 1988; Florida Bar Executive Council of the Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law
Section, 1977 to present. Mr. Kelley is a Fellow of the American College of Trusts and Estates
Counsel and serves on the Fiduciary Litigation Committee of that organization. He is the author
of THE FLORDA BAR PROBATE SYSTEM (1996) published by The Florida Bar, Continuing Legal
Education; Chapter 1: ProceduralConsiderations(co-author), and Chapter 11: Compensation
Disputes, in LrnGATION UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE (1993), published by The Florida Bar,
Continuing Legal Education; and Chapter 15: Fees and Other Expenses of Administration (coauthor), Chapter 19: Homestead and Exempt PersonalProperty (co-author), and Chapter20:
ProbateLitigation, in PRACnCE UNDER THE FLORIDA PROBATE CODE (1994) published by The

Florida Bar, Continuing Legal Education. He is also author of a series of articles entitled
HomesteadMade Easy appearing in the Florida Bar Journal. He has lectured at more than forty
major seminars in the last ten years for The Florida Bar and other professional sponsors on the
topic of trusts and estates.
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To a substantial degree, the topics covered in the prior article are still
the "hot topics" of today. These include attorneys' fees, claims, trusts,
guardianships, joint bank accounts, and elective share. Two added hot topics
are jurisdiction and power of attorney. A topic which has "cooled," and
which has become unusually quiet in the reported cases and in the legislature, is homestead. This last topic has been addressed in other articles
written or contributed to by this author and will not be covered here.
Contrary to the format in the prior article, coverage of legislation will be
integrated in the topical discussion with the case law, and is briefly summarized here.
In 1994, there were no changes at all to the probate statutes, and only
minor changes to the guardianship and advance directive statutes.2 However, the 1995 legislature was very active in the trusts and estates area
adopting chapter 95-401, of the Laws of Florida.3 This omnibus bill,
sponsored by the Real Property and Trust Law Section of The Florida Bar,
addressed probate and trust administration fees and commissions, revised
trust claim procedures, including the repeal of significant trust claim legislation which had been adopted as a part of chapter 93-257, imposed execution
requirements on express trusts, significantly revised the power of attorney
statute, and defined trustee's and personal representative's powers and duties
relative to environmentally contaminated property. An unusual provision
which sounds like "special case" legislation now requires the spouse of a
ward to consent to dissolution before the court can grant special authority to
a guardian to bring or maintain an action for dissolution.
In the 1996 legislative session, there were virtually no statutory changes
relating to trusts or estates statutes, although important legislation in several
relevant areas was introduced. House Bill 2157, which provided for a
significant overhaul of the elective share statutes and incorporated a modified augmented estate concept, failed to pass. It is expected to be reintroduced in the next session.
There were minor changes to chapter 765, having to do with advance
directives, which allow a person to designate a separate surrogate to consent
to mental health treatment, and if no separate surrogate is designated, the
designation of a general surrogate is assumed to include this authority.4

1. Mary Sue Donohue, Probateand Trust Law: 1993 Survey of Florida Law, 18
REV. 355 (1993).
2. See 1994 Fla. Laws ch. 94-183.
3. 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-401.
4. Ch. 96-169, § 49, 1996 Fla. Laws 243,303.
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There were also some changes to chapter 744 regarding guardianships.5
The amendment provides a definition for a professional guardian as a person
who has been compensated for service as guardian for more than two wards
who were not near relatives.6 A professional guardian petitioning for appointment must reveal that guardian's professional status.
A ward may be relocated to an adjacent county without court approval,
but even temporary relocation to any other state or other county must be
immediately reported by the guardian to the court. The class of persons who
may serve on an examining committee has been enlarged.7 Also, the fees of
the examining committee are to "be paid by the guardian from the property
of the ward, or if the ward is indigent, by the county."8 Previously, the fees
were paid from the general fund of the county.9 A guardian of the property
may elect to file annual accountings on a fiscal year basis, unless the court
otherwise orders. This election must be made by the filing of a notice of
intention within thirty days after issuance of letters. A broad class of
defined persons are authorized to bring a proceeding for removal of a
guardian, if notice was not given to them of the original appointment.' 0
Authorized persons are relatives who could qualify as a nonresident guardian
and persons with statutory preference in initial appointment. This, practically, must result in broader service of notice of the initial guardianship
appointment proceedings. Finally, a securities dealer, such as Merrill Lynch,
may now serve as a depository for a guardian in the same manner as a bank
or other financial institution.
Otherwise, 1996 was a very quiet year for
relevant legislation.

5. Ch. 96-354, § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws 2032, 2033 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
744.102(15)).
6. Id.
7. This class includes a graduate gerontologist, and any "other person who by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may in the court's discretion, advise the court in the form
of an expert opinion." Id. § 7, 1996 Fla. Laws at 2034-35 (to be codified at FLA STAT. §
744.331(3)(a)). However, the statute now eliminates lay members and requires that all three
members be qualified persons.
8. Id. § 7, 1996 Fla.Laws at 2035 (to be codified at FLA.STAT. 744.331(7)(b)).
9. This statutory amendment seems to contemplate that the person will be adjudicated incapacitated. What happens if the person is not adjudicated and no guardian is appointed, then what
is the source of payment of the examining committee's fees?
10. See comment on "interested persons" and cases cited under the main title, Guardianships,
infra part VI Guardianships.
11. See Ch. 96-354, §§ 1, 4,7,8,9,10,13, 1996 Fla. Laws 2032,2033-37.
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II. JURISDICTION

Lawyers and trial judges are becoming more jurisdictionally aware.
Previously, the practice was if you could send a formal notice by registered
mail return receipt requested, then jurisdiction was not a problem because
probate or trust administration was an in rem proceeding and the court already
had jurisdiction over the rem. However, the modem view is "first test jurisdiction. ' 2 This was the author's central theme in the articles, Homestead
Made Easy Parts3 and 3A.1 3 These articles suggest that jurisdiction
or notice
4
may be deficient in many determinations of homestead status.'
In personam jurisdiction based on the long arm statute,1 5 typically
thought to be the concern of the commercial litigator or the negligence
lawyer, has become a real concern to the fiduciary litigator. Two cases
found lack of personal jurisdiction over nonresident trustees based on
allegations under the long arm statute.
In Lampe v. Hoyne, 16 a complaint against a successor trustee for breach
of trust, unjust enrichment and declaratory relief alleged jurisdiction over the
defendant stating that she conducted substantial and not isolated activity
within Florida.17 The defendant by special appearance, challenged jurisdiction over her individually and as trustee, and refuted the jurisdictional
allegations of the complaint which alleged only minimum contacts with
Florida.' 8 No traverse was filed by the plaintiff and the appellate court
reversed the trial court holding that there was no jurisdiction over the
trustee. 19
In Beaubien v. Cambridge Consolidated,Ltd.,20 the complaint alleged
that the trustee, acting through an agent, mismanaged the trust and failed to
account to the beneficiary.2 1 The trustee, Cambridge Consolidated, Ltd., was
12. See generally Rohan Kelley & Tae T. Kelley, Homestead Made Easy Part 3: How to
Find the Courthouse and What To Do Next, 59 FLA. B.J. 105 (1995); Rohan Kelly & Tae T.
Kelley, HomesteadMade Easy Part3A: How to Find the Courthouse and What To Do Next, 69
FLA. B.J. 56 (1995).
13. ld.
14. See id.; see also James J. Altman & Rohan Kelley, Procedural Considerations, in
LIGATION UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE, §§ 1.
12-.17 (1993).
15. FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (1995).
16. 652 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
17. Id. at 425.
18. Id. at 426.
19. Id.
20. 652 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
21. Id. at 937.
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a dissolved Cayman Islands corporation. The proper procedure to acquire
personal jurisdiction under the long arm statute is to plead jurisdiction in the
language of the statute.2 A motion to dismiss only tests the legal sufficiency
of the allegations as pled. In order to test the court's jurisdicition, or to
refute the contention of minimum contacts, the defendant must file affidavits
in support of his position. Once this is done, the plaintiff has the burden of
proof, by affidavit or deposition, of the basis upon which jurisdiction may be
obtained.23 Here, the court remanded the matter to the trial court for an
evidentiary hearing on the Florida activities of Cambridge. 24
The lack of Florida business activity, however, did not deter the Fourth
District Court of Appeal from finding in Rogers & Wells v. Winston25 that in
personam jurisdiction existed over a New York law firm when it ordered a
possible refund of excess attorneys' fees paid to that firm for work performed, mainly in New York, for a Florida estate.26 In Rogers & Wells v.
Winston, the fourth district held even though "virtually all of the services ...
[largely federal tax return preparation and tax planning] were performed in
New York" and the "fees ...[were] paid by the trustees out of assets in a
New York marital trust [from decedent's predeceased husband]" and not by
the Florida estate, nonetheless, since the firm was employed to perform
services by a Florida estate it "should have foreseen that it would be haled
into a Florida court in the event of litigation over the services performed for
the estate." 27 Since it was employed to perform services for a Florida estate,
this opinion, and the service on which the court's jurisdiction is based,
apparently did not involve the long-arn statute. Nowhere was that statute
cited in this opinion. Service was made on the law firm by mailed notice
under Rule 5.041(b) of the FloridaProbate Code.2s
The sense of the opinion is that the Florida court has inherent in
personam jurisdiction over non-residents employed by and furnishing
services to a Florida estate even absent compliance with, or allegations based
upon, the long-arm statute. Under prior application of due process considerations, in rem jurisdiction could be obtained over one claiming an interest
22. Id. at 939.
23. Id.

24. Id. at 940-41.
25. 662 So. 2d 1303 (Fla 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 675 So. 2d 929 (Fla.
1996). Please note that the author represented one of the parties in this litigation which may
color the objectivity with which this case is analyzed.
26. Id. at 1304.
27. Id. at 1303-04.
28. Id at 1304.
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in the res through mailed notice, however this was not applicable. In
personam jurisdiction could only be obtained through compliance with the
long-arm statute, through an unrestricted appearance, by requesting affirmative relief in a proceeding, or by personal service of a summons within the
State of Florida. However, none of these methods were applicable here.
The fourth district reached a contrary result, however, in Manufacturers
National Bank of Detroit v. Moons,29 wherein the court held that a mailed
notice in a guardianship proceeding to an out of state trustee for the ward
was insufficient to gain jurisdiction over the out of state trustee to order
payment of attorneys' fees of the guardian's attorney in other non-related
proceedings from trust assets3° .
Finally, in Laushway v. Onofrio31 a removed personal representative
was ordered to account for property transferred to him prior to death, by the
decedent. 32 The defendant contended that the court lacked jurisdiction over
him. Since the trial court clearly had in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant when he was removed as personal representative after having been
found guilty of procuring the last will by undue influence, that jurisdiction
continued to permit the present order.33
II. ATroRNEYS' FEES
Is the probate and trust attorneys' fee trauma over? Has the birth concluded or are we still in labor? Is the baby healthy or genetically flawed? In
the prior iteration of this article, Ms. Donohue recorded the first and second
phase of the metamorphosis of this topic and this article will record, hopefully,
the final phase.
To recap, prior to 1976 there was no statutory provision relating to how
the fee of the attorneys was to be determined, other than that a personal

29. 659 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
30. Id. at 475.
"[F]ormal notice" used to obtain service in probate and in guardianship matters
was not sufficient in trust related proceedings to confer on the court jurisdiction
over the trustee; rather, pursuant to section 737.201, FloridaStatutes, proceedings related to trusts were governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure of Florida.
The latter, of course, prescribe summons or other process issued by or under
authority of the court and served as provided by law.
Id.
31. 670 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
32. Id. at 1136.
33. Id.
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representative was allowed necessary expenses including attorneys' fees
paid in the settlement of the estate.34 The 1976 Florida Probate Code
provided for a "reasonable fee" to be paid to the personal representative, the
attorney and other agents employed by the personal representative. 35 Like
many other states, the statute also grafted the ethical concepts which are
used to identify a "reasonable" fee into the statute. 36 However, these
concepts did not adapt particularly well to the determination of an attorney's
fee for probate administration 37 and over the sixteen years since this statute
was adopted, there were at least two amendments made in the hopes of
achieving a better fit.
With the 1976 statutory change, the actual practice of setting the fee
remained generally unchanged. Nearly universally, probate attorneys' fees
were set as a percentage of the value of the estate, as were the fees paid to
corporate personal representatives. Over time, market forces, and supply
and demand, overtook the probate bar and demands by some consumers
resulted in some attorneys changing the method used to determine the fee to
be charged. In many cases, lawyers and firms, generally the larger firms,
determined and charged their attorneys' fees for probate matters based on an
hourly charge, with little or no consideration to the value of the assets under
administration. 8

34. FtA. STAT. § 734.01 (1973).
35. Id. § 733.617 (1975).
36. See MODEL Rt.Es OFPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1995). See also FLA. RuLEs
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-1.5(b) (1987).
37. The "reasonable fee" and "ethical" concepts were little help in determining fees for
fiduciaries or their agents, although these fees were also controlled by the same statute and the
same considerations applied.
38. It is understandable that estate beneficiaries generally wish to hire lawyers at the smallest
possible fee. In very large estates, the beneficiaries would want to have the fee determined on an
hourly charge, while in very small estates, the beneficiaries would prefer the fee be calculated
based on a percentage. For purposes of this discussion, assume two example estates. The first
estate has an inventory value of $40,000 and the second, a value of $4,000,000. If both estates
required approximately the same amount of professional time to administer (assume 50 hours),
and a reasonable rate is considered to be $150 per hour for the smaller estate and $300 for the
larger estate, the fee would be $15,000 for the larger estate and the fee for the smaller estate
would be $7,500.
As a percentage of the value of the assets, that translates to 18.75% in the smaller estate and
.375% in the larger. The beneficiaries in the larger estate are pleased. If the fee is percentagebased (assuming the scale in the 1995 statute), the fee in the smaller estate is $1,500, while the fee
in the larger estate is $95,000. The applicable percentage then is 3.75% for the smaller estate and
2.375% for the larger estate. The beneficiaries in the smaller estate are pleased.
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This was the fee environment in place when FloridaPatient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe 39 and Standard Guaranty InsuranceCo. v. Quanstrom4°
(neither were probate fee cases) were decided and which defined the
"lodestar" method of fee determination. 41 These cases stood for the proposition that the controlling ethical considerations, taken as a whole, applied to
determine a reasonable fee, to be paid by one who was not the lawyer's
client (the loosing party in these two cases), required imposition of an
hourly-based charge.4 2 The opinions in Rowe and Quanstrom were written
by Justice Ben Overton, who then also wrote the opinion, In re Estate of
Platt,43 which applied the Rowe and Quanstromreasoning specifically to fee
determination in probate administration. 44 The Platt rule established that, in
the absence of an enforceable agreement, if the fee for the attorney for the
personal representative and the fee for the personal representative is to be set
by the court, it may not be set based solely on a percentage of the value of
the assets.45 This is so in spite of the language of the controlling statute,
which provides that the court shall consider "one or more" 46 of the statutory
factors in setting a reasonable fee and which provides that one of the
statutory factors is "[t]he nature and value 47
of the assets of the estate, [and]
the amount of income earned by the estate."
Platt was far ranging in laying down rules for the determination of fees
in probate administration matters and included a number of additional rules,
which are more fully reviewed in Ms. Donohue's case analysis in the prior
survey article and also in this author's article in Practice Under Florida
Probate Code.48 However, the "central holding" of Platt was that neither
the attorney's fee nor the personal representative's fee could be determined
While it is true that larger estates generally require the expenditure of more time, this is not
always the case; and in any instance, the relationship is not linear. In some instances, more
professional time is expended on a smaller estate than a larger estate. Of course, it goes without
saying that the lawyer's liability is always much greater in the larger estate.
39. 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985).
40. 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990).
41. Id. at 830-35 (discussing the origin and calculation of attorneys' fees under the
"Lodestar" method); Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1150-52.
42. See Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 835; Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1150.
43. 586 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1991).
44. la at 333.
45. Id. at 336-37.
46. Id. at 332 (citing FLA. STAT. § 733.617 (1975)).
47. Id. at 332-33 (citing FLA. STAT. § 733.617 (1989)).
48. See John Arthur Jones & Rohan Kelley, Compensation of Personal Representative and
Attorney and OtherExpenses of Administration, in PRACTICE UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE, §
15.23 (1994).
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based solely on a percentage of the value of the estate. 49 The opinion went
on to require the attorney's portion of the fee to be set as an hourly-based
charge, but failed to provide any guidance with regard to how the personal
representative's fee should be set.
It was within this environment that the Real Property Probate and Trust
Law ("RPPTL") section of The Florida Bar determined that the Platt opinion
was too narrow and, while it might work well for the insurance defense bar
or plumbers, fees determined under Platt would not consistently or fairly
compensate the probate bar for legal services performed in probate administration. This was particularly true in administration of large taxable estates
where the responsibility assumed by the lawyer, but not necessarily the time
expended, was significant.
Since the RPPTL section perceived that reasonable compensation
properly involved two factors, time reasonably expended (effort) and
responsibility assumed (liability), if an hourly rate was the only allowable
compensation method, where responsibility was significant, it could only be
properly compensated if the number of hours expended was also large.
Lawyers observed that generally, responsibility (liability) attached upon
acceptance of the representation and did not increase or decrease regardless
of the effort (hours) required to perform the services. Therefore, if the
responsibility was great because of the nature of the administration and the
value of the assets, but the administration could be accomplished in a small
number of hours, responsibility was under compensated if it was a factor
included in the hourly rate. By contrast, if responsibility was comparatively
small and built into the hourly rate, but the problems experienced were very
time consuming, responsibility was overcompensated. This was true even if
the hourly rate paid was adjusted because, in practice, it was not sufficiently
elastic to adjust for factors which it was not best suited to compensate.
The RPPTL section chairman appointed a committee to study the
problems of compensation which were raised by the Platt decision and to
recommend solutions.50 This committee was know as the Belcher Committee after its chairman: 5
The Belcher Committee proposed a radical and untested formula for
probate attorney compensation which had never been tried either by statute,
rule, or in practice, in any other jurisdiction. The formula was designed to
compensate attorneys for probate administration by separately compensating
49. Platt,586 So. 2d at 336-37.

50. The author served as a member of that Committee.
51. William S. Belcher, Esq. (1924-1992).
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effort and responsibility. The committee drafted an entirely new statute
incorporating this concept.
The goal of the Committee was to return compensation levels to
approximately those that existed in actual practice prior to 1991 when Platt
changed the rules; it was not the intention of the committee to increase fees
paid to lawyers in probate administration. To accomplish the goal of
fairness to the lawyer and to the client while still retaining historical compensation levels, and also adopting an entire new method of compensation,
the committee members called on their many years of experience in probate
administration and setting fees and devised a formula intended to accomplish
the desired result. That formula provided for a bifurcated fee, a one percent
charge against the probate assets, including income earned during administration, to compensate responsibility (liability was most directly related to
the value of estate assets) plus an adjusted hourly-based fee to compensate
effort.
So as not to "double-dip," the hourly rate to compensate effort should be
reduced under the lawyer's general office hourly rate because responsibility
assumed, normally a factor in the hourly rate, was being compensated separately. By this formula, if effort (time) was high in relation to responsibility
(measured by the size of the estate), then responsibility would not be overcompensated as it would if it was included as a part of an hourly charge. If
responsibility (liability) was high in relation to effort required (time), then
responsibility would be fairly compensated. The formula was self-adjusting
for estates which did not fit a "cookie cutter" composition.
A second new concept adopted was that the fee determined by the
formula was presumptively reasonable. However, by considering a set of
eight probate-specific factors identified in the statute, the presumptively
reasonable fee could be adjusted upward or downward to reach a reasonable
fee for the particular probate administration.
However, the "great experiment" was doomed to failure before it began.
When the Belcher committee reported its recommendations to the executive
counsel of the RPPTL section, in general meeting, that counsel doubled the
proposed responsibility fee from the one percent of the value of the assets
recommended by the Belcher committee to two percent of the value of the
probate assets and tacked on a "surcharge" of an additional one percent of
the value of non-probate assets over which the probate attorney had no
responsibility. Thus, compensation for responsibility was increased from a
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minimum of 100% to perhaps thousands of percent over that recommended
by the Belcher committee.5 2
Upon becoming law, this new fee statute was immediately perceived by
the bench and the media (as well as substantial portions of the probate bar)
as resulting in excessive compensation for probate attorneys; substantially in
excess of the facts which were in general usage before Platt. At the trial
court level, few judges were willing to award the presumed reasonable fee
and many experienced probate lawyers were quoting fees to their prospective
clients which were substantially less that the presumed reasonable statutory
rate. However, lawyers who were not probate specialists, or who had less
experience in the field, generally quoted fees for their services at the rates
presumed reasonable by the statute. Thus, the anomaly was created that the
most experienced probate lawyers were quoting and charging fees at a lower
rate than lawyers with less experience.53
An example of the anomalous results produced by application of the
statutory presumption is found in Sitomer v. FirstAmerica Bank-Central.54
In this administration, the probate assets were valued at $104,000, but
decedent had created an out-of-state corporate-trusteed revocable trust with a
value of approximately $25,000,000. 55 The only connection the large trust
had with the probate administration was that it was required to be reported
on the estate's federal estate tax return which, although signed by the
personal representative, was not prepared by the personal representative or
his attorney. 56 By application of the one percent "surcharge" to non-probate
assets, in addition to the two percent of the value of the probate assets and
100 hours of attorney time in the probate, the presumptively reasonable fee

52. The proposed rate was so high that Senator Fred Dudley who was tapped to sponsor the
section's legislative package in the senate, refused to introduce the bill at the rates now included
for responsibility. However, a different sponsor was located in the house and a bill with those

rates was introduced, and was eventually adopted with no change to the rates, as House Bill 1295.
This bill later became chapter 93-257 of the Laws of Florida.
A shortcoming of the proposed change which was inherent in the Belcher Committee proposal was the failure to scale the percentage compensation for responsibility back at higher levels,
for example, over $5,000,000 in asset value.
53. This author was one of those who opposed the increase in the statutory rates over the
levels recommended by the Belcher Committee and consistently lobbied all who would listen for
a reduction in the rates set in the statute.
54. 667 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).

55. Id. at 457.
56. The attorney was also the personal representative and signed the federal estate tax return;
however, any fee for serving as personal representative was affirmatively and intentionally
waived.

Published by NSUWorks, 1996

11

Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 10

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 21:385

determined by the statutory formula was $265,236.57, an amount that was
more than two and one-half times greater than the value of the total of the
probate estate. The trial court considered the factors in the statute and
determined that $30,000 was a reasonable fee to compensate responsibility
and that an hourly rate of $300 was correct for 100 hours of effort. Accordingly, the court awarded a total adjusted fee of $60,000. This award was
subsequently affirmed by the Fourth District Court of Appeal.
Another case of interest which addressed the fee presumed reasonable
57 This was a disciplinary
by the 1993 statute was Florida Bar v. Garland.
case in which one of the charges against the lawyer, on which the referee
determined guilt, was charging a clearly excessive fee in a probate administration. 58 Mr. Garland charged a fee of $32,956.30 on a probate estate with
a gross value of $590,000. 59 Expert testimony established a reasonable fee at
$15,000 to $18,000. 60 The fee was determined and collected under the
statute prior to the 1993 amendment as interpreted by Platt.61 The supreme
court overturned the referee's finding of charging a clearly excessive fee
under rule 4-1.5(a)(1). 6 2 It said:
We agree with Garland that in light of sections 733.617 and
733.6171, Florida Statutes (1993), which provide the manner by
which reasonable fees to the personal representative and attorney
of an estate are to be determined, the referee's recommendation as
to this violation must be rejected. Although sections 733.617 and
733.6171 did not became [sic] effective until after the Locke estate
was closed, if the fee charged in this case were charged today it
likely would
be considered reasonable under the new statutory pro63
visions.
This statement of the law was a surprise to the author and others who
believed that a fee could be calculated under the formula provided in the
statute as presumed reasonable, and still violate the constraints of Rule 4-1.5(a)
of the Rules of Professional Conduct of Florida, since one is a guideline
established by the legislature under which a court may determine an attorney's

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

651 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1995).
Id. at 1183.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1184; Platt,586 So. 2d at 336-37.
Garland,651 So. 2d at 1184.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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fee, and the other is a professionally imposed constraint on charging and
collecting a clearly excessive fee.64 However, it would appear that the final
word, at least for now, has been spoken on this point.
To its credit, the leadership in the probate bar, and specifically in the
RPPTL section, quickly recognized that the 1993 statute often produced an
excessive fee (of course the media was running exposes on the fee-gouging
probate lawyers and judges were routinely adjusting fees downward under
the statutory presumed reasonable rate), and prepared legislation to remedy
the situation.
Two alternative approaches to "fixing the mess" were considered. The
first alternative was to retreat to the compensation levels initially proposed
by the Belcher Committee (and also scaling back the applicable percentage
in larger estates) and giving the bifurcated concept another try to see if it
would work. The second alternative was to scrap the entire bifurcated fee
concept and start over entirely.
The consensus within the RPPTL section was that the "well had been
poisoned" and the bifurcated fee was (perhaps unfairly) branded as the
culprit and as excessive in concept, and not merely by its operation. Therefore, those who were in a position to make the decision elected to abandon
the bifurcated fee concept entirely and begin again. This is an unfortunate
result, in this author's opinion, since inherently the statutory bifurcated fee is
the most reasonable approach to setting probate attorney's fees and if the
rates had not been initially set at excessive levels, might have served as a
model which could have been adopted in other jurisdictions. However, this
author concurred that the practical solution was to begin anew and in this
case, throw the baby out with the bath water.
In order to accomplish this, the obvious starting point was with the
compensation formula which had been adopted to compensate personal
representatives. This formula was both simple to apply and had not created
the media firestorm which the attorneys' fee statute had. In fact, there had
been little complaint regarding the compensation formula or resulting fees
for personal representatives since the new statute was adopted in 1993
concurrently with the offending attorneys' fee statute.
The other favorable aspect of that statute, in addition to its absence of
controversy, was its simplicity of application. Specifically, time and hourly
rates were not required to be determined. It was generally considered that
the attorney for the personal representative contributed as much value to the
64. This point of view is discussed at section 15.38 of Practice Under Florida Probate
Code. See Jones & Kelley, supra note 48, § 15.38.
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probate administration as did the fiduciary, and the logical extension was
that the attorney should be equally compensated with the fiduciary.65 There
was also some case law authority which predated the adoption of the 1976
statute, for this approach.6 6
A committee was again appointed by the chairman of the RPPTL
section, comprised of the surviving members of the Belcher Committee and
several others, to draft a proposal for new legislation. Using the personal
representative's compensation formula as a template, with adjustments, a
significant conceptual overhaul was quickly accomplished. Actually, very
little redlining was required in 733.6171; merely deleting subsection (3)(a)
(compensation for responsibility) and subsection (3)(b) (compensation for
effort), and copying over a sliding scale (with minor adjustment), percentage-based formula as found in 733.617(2), 67 the statute setting compensation
for the personal representative. When this had been done, since the formula
compensation clearly excluded compensation for extraordinary services, it
was necessary to define a representative list of those services, and that was
added as new subsection (4).
Of note, and in contrast to the recent media characterization of probate
lawyers as fee-gouging, the Committee believed that the sliding scale at
levels over $3,000,000 in assets, may produce an excessive fee. Therefore,
at that level and upward, the schedule found in the statute providing compensation for the fiduciary was cut back for attorneys' fees by one-half
percent. The Committee's recommendation was adopted by the executive
counsel, this time without the fatal tinkering to the percentages, and a
sponsor offered the bill in the legislature which became chapter 95-401,
section 2, and which became law on June 18, 1995.68
Another revolutionary concept which was reported out of the Committee, and adopted by the executive counsel, again without change, was a
statutory "presumed reasonable" attorneys' fee for representing a trustee in
the initial administration of a revocable trust as a will substitute. This

65. Although it was not considered by the Committee in drafting the statute, this previous
survey, published shortly after the 1993 amendments to the statute, predicted the ultimate
direction of the law on this point. As Ms. Donohue stated: "It is not clear why there is a
distinction between compensation as a personal representative and for attorney fees paid on the
same estate." Donohue, supranote 1, at 361. With the 1995 change, that is now the law.
66. See, e.g., In re Lieber's Estate, 103 So. 2d 192, 201 (Fla. 1958).
67. See FLA. STAT. § 733.617(2) (1993).
68. Ch. 95-401, § 43, 1995 Fla. Laws 3275, 3310.
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became section 4 of chapter 95-401, which was later codified at section
733.2041, of the FloridaStatutes.69
The concept which this statute recognizes is that the legal value added
to the process of administration of a revocable trust as a will substitute is
approximately the same value added to a probate administration of the same
assets. The effort required and the responsibility assumed are approximately
the same.
Therefore, reasonable compensation should be approximately the
70
same.
The specific point should be made that the trustee is not required to
retain counsel for administration, contrasted with a personal representative
who is so required. 71 Also, the trustee may retain the lawyer for specific and
limited purposes and, like a similar provision pertaining to probate administration, may agree to a fee different that the one the statute presumes
reasonable. The substantial public interest to be served is that some certainty is created regarding fees for this type of service.
The structure of the trustee attorneys' fee statute72 is nearly identical to
the structure of the amended probate attorneys' fee statute.73 The only
difference of note is the inclusion in the trust statute of a laundry list of
ordinary services, that list being absent in the probate statute. The reason for
this difference was that it was felt that ordinary services in probate administration are generally well known, whereas revocable trust initial administration is a new concept not widely known throughout the bar. As a result,
in the trust statute, both ordinary legal services as well as extraordinary legal
services are identified.
The compensation rates for trust legal services are set at seventy-five
percent of the rates for probate legal services, and use the same sliding scale

69. See FLA. STAT. § 733.2041 (1995). The Florida Bankers' Association successfully
lobbied an amendment to the bill which eliminates any presumption of a reasonable fee if the
trustee or one of the trustees is a corporate fiduciary. This "bankers exception" may suffer from
congenital constitutional defects.
70. The legal services compensated directly and logically in this statute are the same legal
services which were intended to be compensated by the one percent "surcharge" added to the
1993 version of section 733.6171, except that surcharge applied to all non-probate assets (eg. life
insurance proceeds, IRA roll-overs, joint bank accounts, entireties real property, homestead real
property, etc.). It is true that the lawyer will expend substantial effort and assume substantial
responsibility in the initial trust administration, but probably neither is the case as to the other
listed non-probate assets. This direct approach to a specific situation is far superior to the
"shotgun" approach of the prior statute.
71. FLA. PROBATE CODE RULE 5.030(a) (1996).
72. FLA. STAT. § 733.6171 (1995).
73. See id. § 737.2041 (1995).
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of value to reach a presumed reasonable fee. The reason for the reduction of
twenty-five percent in the fee is that some of the work will not be required in
a trust administration; for example, marshalling of the assets would not be
required if the trust was previously funded.
As is the case in the probate statute, review or preparation of the federal
estate tax return is a defined extraordinary legal service. For preparation, a
presumed reasonable fee is one-half percent of the value of the gross estate
up to ten million and one-quarter percent on the value of the excess.
An interesting but often unnoticed remedial provision was also added
by chapter 95-401 which became subsections (2) through (4) of section
737.204. 74 Under previous procedure, if a beneficiary wished to challenge a
fee paid to the trustee, the trustee's attorney, or any trust agent, the only
alternative was to bring a civil action under the provisions of section
737.201 and serve all necessary parties with a summons or by publication. If
there is a pending associated probate administration, the idea is that a
probate proceeding would be a convenient forum to resolve issues of trust
fees and objections to those fees. So the statutory amendment grants subject
matter jurisdiction to the probate judge and provides that formal notice may
be used, rather than forms of service required in a civil action. One should
note in passing that there are extensive new trust attorneys' fee provisions in
section 737.2041, but there is still no statutory provision which quantifies or
sets a fee for the trustee, not even a statutory requirement that the fee be a
"reasonable fee." As noted below, it is this author's opinion that Platt will

74. Id. § 737.204(2)-(4) (1995). This section, entitled, "Proceedings for review of employment of agents and review of compensation of trustee and employees of trust--" provides in part:
(2) If the settlor's estate is being probated, the trustee, the attorney, or any
interested person may have the propriety of employment and the reasonableness
of the compensation of the trustee or any person employed by the trustee determined in the probate proceeding.
(3) In any proceeding under this section the petitioner shall either:
(a) Serve notice on all interested persons in the manner provided for service
of formal notice under s. 731.301, together with a notice advising the interested
person that an answer to the petition must be filed and served on petitioner
within 20 days from the service of the petition or the petition may be considered
ex parte, and such notice shall be sufficient for the court to acquire jurisdiction
for this proceeding over the person receiving formal notice to the extent of the
person's interest in the trust; or
(b) Obtain jurisdiction over interested persons in any other manner permitted by law.
(4) Persons given notice as provided in this section shall be bound by all orders entered on the petition.
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apply to the determination of a trustee's fee, but not (as to those matters
contained in the statute) to the determination of an attorney's fee for the
trustee's attorney.
Section 733.6171(7),75 reversed another of the holdings of Platt. That
subsection provides for the award of attorneys' fees for the attorney for the
personal representative if court proceedings are required to determine
attorney's fees. This would normally be the case where no agreement could
be reached on the fees, and an objection to the fees was filed. The statute
was improved by the 1995 amendment which proscribed the award of fees
under this provision if "the court finds the request for attorney's fees to be
substantially unreasonable. ' 76 This same provision and the same 77limitation
is also found in section 737.2041 relating to trustee attorneys' fees.
An important concept which was included in chapter 93-257 is found in
subsection (8) of section 733.617 1.78 Subsection (8) provides: "This section
shall apply to estates in which an order of discharge has not been entered
prior to its effective date but not to those estates in which attorney's
fees
79
have previously been determined by order of court after notice."
The purpose of this effective date provision was to apply the new
procedure to determine reasonable attorneys' fees to estates then in administration. Of course, this was what happened upon Platt being decided. The
court did not limit its application only to estate probates commenced after
the opinion issued; rather, the Platt procedures for determination of a
reasonable fee applied to all estates then in probate. The intention was to
achieve parity between what the court had done with Platt and what the
legislature had done with chapter 93-257. This same language continues in
the present statute.
However, this provision quickly came under constitutional attack in
Williams College v. Bourne.80 In Williams College, the fifth district initially
75. See id. § 733.6171 (1993). This was renumbered as 733.6171(8) in the 1995 amend-

ment.

76. FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(8) (1995). See also Williams College v. Bourne, 670 So. 2d
1118 (5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996), which was decided approximately three months before the
effective date of this amendment, where the court notes: "Williams College points out that the
mandatory language of this legislation leaves open the argument that fees for the personal
representative's attorney must be paid for the fee litigation even if the fee request is exorbitant
and only a fraction of the claimed fees is awarded." Id at 1121 n.5.
77. See FLA. STAT. § 737.2041 (1995).
78. Id. § 733.6171(8) (1993). This section has been renumbered as 733.6171(10) in the

1995 amendment.
79. Id
80. 625 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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reversed and remanded the trial court's finding from May of 1991 that
Williams College had agreed to a valid percentage-based fee contract with
the attorney. 81 A petition for discharge in the estate was filed on June 29,
1990, which predated Platt and all of the ensuing statutory changes. The
only remaining item of administration was to determine the attorney's fee.
The initial fee request from the attorney for the personal representative was
$125,175.54.82
After remand, but before further trial ensued, section 733.6171(8) was
adopted which directed the court to determine the fee, absent an agreement
(which the appellate court had already determined was not binding), based
on the fee presumed reasonable in the new statute. 83 In accordance with the
statute, the trial judge made that determination and found a fee of $116,676
to be reasonable.84 However, since Platt had also been decided in the
interim, the trial judge also made a determination in accord with the Platt
guidelines, in case section 733.6171(8) was constitutionally defective and
Platt controlled the determination. 85 A reasonable fee decided under the
Plattguidelines was $63,624.86
The constitutionality of the "retroactive" effect of section 733.6171(8)
was argued and the trial judge ruled on that issue. The court ruled that the
portion of the statute which provides how a reasonable fee is to be determined is not a new right, but rather a modification of existing procedures.87
However, the court held that section 733.6171(7), which allowed fees for the
process of determining fees, was a new entitlement which did not previously
exist, and found this provision to be unconstitutional to the extent it is
applied retroactively. As the court stated:
An analysis of the case law suggests that a distinction should be
drawn between cases where a new right or entitlement is created
and cases where procedures concerning an existing right are modified. Not surprisingly, this case has both. The estate has always
been obligated to pay a reasonable attorney's fee in this case. The

81. Id. at 914.
82. Williams College v. Bourne, 670 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
83. See Williams College v. Bourne, 656 So. 2d 622, 623 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
84. Id at 623.
85. Williams College, 625 So. 2d at 914 n.1.
86. Williams College, 656 So. 2d at 623 (applying In re Estate of Platt, 586 So. 2d 328
(Fla. 1991)).
87. In re Estate of Rosenburg, Fla. Admin. Order No. PR88-911 (June 24, 1994) (on file
with Clerk, Probate Div. Orange County Cir. Ct).
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method of determining fees has varied but the obligation has not.
The Court finds that the application of F.S. 733.6171 to determine
a reasonable fee in this case is not an unconstitutional deprivation
of a vested right.
On the other hand, F.S. 733.6176(7) (sic) provides for the recovery of costs and fees expended to determine compensation.
These items were not recoverable under Platt and it is fundamentally unfair to impose a new obligation retroactively to this set of
facts. The Court finds that the application of F.S. 733.6171(7) to
impose fees previously unrecoverable to be unconstitutional.88
Not surprisingly, this ruling was appealed.8 9 The appellate court again
reversed the trial judge, this time finding that the fee award was not controlled by section 733.6171(8), but rather application of the statute to
determine attorneys' fees earned for services rendered before the statute
becomes effective was unconstitutional and these fees must be determined in
accordance with the procedures mandated by Platt(requiring the award of an
hourly fee in the amount of $63,624). 90 This author disagrees with the fifth
district and believes that the trial judge properly determined the constitutional issues.
The underlying law relating to the constitutionality of a statutory
amendment and its application to events occurring before the amendment is
that substantive changes in the law generally cannot have retroactive effect
although remedial or procedural provisions may. 91 The Fifth District Court
of Appeal addressed the question of whether the amendment to section
733.6171, which fixed the method to be followed to determine a reasonable
fee, is procedural on the one hand, and therefore constitutional, or substantive on the other hand, and thus unconstitutional.9 2
In Miami Children's Hospital v. Tamayo,93 the court considered94
whether its decision in FloridaPatient's Compensation Fund,Inc. v. Rowe
should be applied retroactively to limit attorneys' fees awardable by statute
against the losing party in a medical malpractice action where the action
88. Id.

89. See Williams College v. Bourne, 656 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
90. Id. at 623. It is interesting to note that Plat was also decided after the attorney's
services had been rendered in the estate.
91. Village of El Portal v. City of Miami Shores, 362 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1978).
92. Williams College, 656 So. 2d at 623.

93. 529 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 1988).
94. 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985).
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arose prior to the Rowe decision.95 The court held "[w]e emphasize that the
factors to be utilized in computing a reasonable attorney's fee, whether
of Professional Responsibility or
established by this Court through the Code
96
nature.,
in
procedural
are
law,
case
by
The supreme court also considered the retroactive effect of section
768.56 (in medical malpractice actions attorneys' fee awarded to the prevailing party-the statute upon which Rowe was based) in cases where the
cause of action accrued before the effective date of the statute.97
In Florida, it is clear that in the absence of an explicit legislative
expression to the contrary, a substantive law is to be construed as
having prospective effect only.... This rule mandates that statutes
that interfere with vested rights will not be given retroactive effect.
On the other hand, statutes which relate only to the procedure or
remedy are generally held applicable to all pending cases. In
McCord v. Smith, 43 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1949), we stated:
A retrospective provision of a legislative act is not necessarily
invalid. It is so only in those cases wherein ... a new obligation or duty is created or imposed ... in connection with

transactions or considerations previously had or expiated. 98

Under these concepts, therefore, the trial judge appears to be correct that a
change in the method by which a reasonable fee is determined is only remedial
and is permitted to have retroactive effect, especially where so directed by the
legislature. However, the creation of a right to collect attorneys' fees for a
dispute involving the determination of fees, where that right did not previously
exist, would be unconstitutional if applied to a fee determination in progress
when the statute was enacted.
The next step in the continuing saga began when the attorney filed a
petition for allowance of attorneys' fees for services rendered in the proceedings to determine fees, but only for that part of the services rendered
after the statute became effective. This petition was based on language in
the Williams opinion, that "once the services by the attorney for the estate
were rendered, the estate became obligated to pay a reasonable attorney fee
... based on then applicable law." 99 Based on that statement, the attorney
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Tamayo, 529 So. 2d at 667.
Id. at 668.
Young v. Altenhaus, 472 So. 2d 1152, 1154 (Fla. 1985).
Id. (citations omitted).
Williams College, 656 So. 2d at 623.
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reasoned that attorneys' fees incurred after the effective date of section
733.6171(7) incurred on the issue of determination of attorneys' fees, would
be compensable. He filed a motion in the trial court to allow attorney fees
for services after October 1, 1993.100 The trial court allowed those fees and
the appeal ensued. Maintaining its consistency, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal reversed the trial judge and ruled:

[T]he Williams ... panel utilized principles analogous to those
found in Young and L. Ross to find that Ward had a cause of action
against the estate for the value of his services from the moment he
began to render them. It was at that moment when, although the
ultimate fee amount would increase over the course of Ward's
services, the estate's liability to compensate Ward was legally
fixed, as was the legal formula by which the fees would be calculated. The subsequent enactment of a statute that provided for a
new formula could not constitutionally be effective to enhance that
liability.
... To the extent Ward did or did not possess the right to
compensation calculated in a certain way and the right to charge his
time to litigate his own compensation, these rights were inextricably bundled
at the moment Ward began his representation of the
10 1
estate.
If this is correct law, it is an unfortunate policy result. All estates, probate
of which has commenced after October 1, 1993, and before June 18, 1995,
would be locked into the bloated bifurcated compensation formula that the
probate bar worked so hard to eliminate.
A concept generally overlooked by lawyers and judges who assume that
later statutory amendments in the area of fees "reversed Platt" is that the
Platt rules for determination of a reasonable fee continue to apply in all
probate, trust, and guardianship proceedings for fees other than attorneys'
fees for representing the fiduciary in probate administration and initial trust
administration and fees of the personal representative. This continued
application of Platt would include, at least, determination of a reasonable fee
under section 744.108 (guardianship attorneys' fees and guardians' fees),
section 733.106(2) (attorneys' fees awarded to a person offering a will in
100. Williams College, 670 So. 2d at 1119.
101. Id. at 1121 (referring to Young v. Altenhaus, 472 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1985); L. Ross,
Inc. v. R.W. Roberts Constr. Co., 466 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. (1985), approved,
481 So. 2d484 (Fla. 1986).
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good faith), section 733.106(3) (fees to an attorney who benefits an estate),
section 733.609 (fees awarded in an action challenging proper exercise of a
personal representative's powers), section 737.627 (fees awarded in an
action challenging proper exercise of a trustee's powers), and section
737.204 (trustees' fees). An argument can be made that Plattalso applies to
determine fees for employees or agents of the personal representative (or the
trustee); however, there is no further authority on this point, and certain
applications would appear to be illogical (e.g. a fee to a real estate broker for
sale of estate real property, or to an auction house for sale of a valuable
collection of personalty).
Finally, with regard to the topic of probate and trust attorneys' fees,
there is one additional change included in the 1995 amendment and a
sampling of recent cases on the subject of attorney fees which will be
addressed here.
New subsection (9) was added to section 733.6171 which requires that
the amount and manner of determining compensation for the attorney must
be disclosed in the final accounting'0 2 unless the disclosure is waived in
writing by the parties bearing the impact of the fees, and those waivers must
be filed. If waived, the content of the waiver must meet certain requirements. First, the waiver must contain a statement that the party has actual
knowledge of the amount and manner of determining the attorney compensation, and in addition, that the waiving party either has agreed to the
compensation or that the waiving party has a right to petition the court to
decrease the compensation and is waiving that right. 0 3 Waivers which do
not meet these requirements are ineffective.
Two cases are worthy of mention. In Berger v. Brooks'°4 a discharged
attorney for a personal representative was entitled to a fee based on quantum
meruit; however, the amount awarded could not exceed the total of the fee
contracted for. In this case, the agreed fee was $1,000, but the attorney
applied for a quantum meruit fee of $8,800. The trial court also ruled that
section 733.6171 is unconstitutional without stating the basis for that

102. FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(a) (1995). This was an oversight on the part of the legislature.
Disclosures regarding fees are typically stated in the petition for discharge, not, except as a line
item, in the final accounting. Courts and clerks generally are accepting the accounting and the
petition for discharge if the disclosures are contained in the petition for discharge. It is to be
expected that this statute will be amended to conform with the practice.

103. Id.
104. 657 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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ruling.' °5 The Third District Court of Appeal reversed this portion of the
trial judge's order which declared the statute unconstitutional.1 6
In Dew v. Nerreter,10 7 the trial court awarded a fee to the attorney for an
unsuccessful will contestant under 733.106(3).0 s Under some limited
circumstances fees under this statute have been allowed to the attorney for a
nonprevailing party in estate litigation.U1 9 However the services rendered in
this case were of no benefit to the estate and the fee award was reversed.110
IV. CLAIMS
This topic has been active in recent case law regarding the nature of the
applicable statutory provisions.
There are three possible classifications of statutory provisions purporting to bar claims:
1) a statute of repose or nonclaim;
2) a statute of limitations; and
3) a rule ofjudicial procedure.
There are also three different actions that may be taken regarding estate
claims which are affected by the different types of statutory provisions:
1) filing the claim
A. where the potential claimant has received notice
B. where the potential claimant has not received notice
2) objection to the claim
3) commencement of an independent action on the claim.

105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 1282.
Id.
664 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 1180. Section 733.106 entitled, Costs and attorney fees, provides in part:

(3) Any attorney who has rendered services to an estate may apply for an
order awarding attorney fees, and after informal notice to the personal representative and all persons bearing the impact of the payment the court shall enter its
order on the petition. FLA. STAT. § 733.106(3) (1995).
109. See, e.g., In re Estate of Lewis, 442 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983); In re
Whitehead's Estate, 287 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1973).
110. Dew, 664 So. 2d at 1180-81.
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The nature of the statute impacts the rights of the party charged to act if
that action is tardy or does not occur and impacts the ability to obtain relaxation of the statutory deadline. The importance of determining the effect of the
statutory provisions on the actions or inactions of parties is not well understood, as evidenced by the divergence in result in the reported cases.
A statute of nonclaim or repose is an automatic and complete bar to a
claim. A late filed claim may simply be ignored and need not be stricken on
motion. Defenses such as estoppel or fraud are unavailable to the claimant
and the court cannot extend the time for filing the claim (unless specifically
authorized by the nonclaim statute)."'
A statute of limitations, in contrast, must be pled and proved by the
estate as an affirmative defense or it is waived. It is also subject to the
defense of estoppel or fraud which may be raised by reply under Rule 1.100
of the FloridaRules of Civil Procedure!12
A rule of judicial procedure is a limitation which may be relaxed or
extended, even after it has expired, in the broad discretion of the judge for
good cause shown. In Yerex v. Durzo, 1 3 the fourth district interpreted
section 733.705(4) as a rule of judicial procedure rather than a statute of
nonclaim and the court allowed a late filing of an independent action, after
objection to the claim. 14 In this case, the widow's claim was contingent5
upon the personal representative suing her, which event had not occurred."
Since the filing of an independent action on the
claim was premature, the
6
trial court granted an extension of time to file."
A difference of opinion exists regarding the classifications of sections
733.702 and 733.710 as either statutes of nonclaim or statutes of limitation.
What is surprising is the number of reported opinions from the various
courts of appeal which have totally ignored a statement in the supreme court
majority opinion in Spohr v. Berryman117 that "[w]hile known as a statute of

111. See FLA. STAT. § 733.702(3) (1995). This section provides: "an extension [of time to
file a claim] may be granted only upon grounds of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the
claims period." Id
112. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.100.
113. 651 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
114. Id. at 221.
115. Id
116. Id
117. 589 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1991).
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nonclaim, it [733.702] is nevertheless a statute of limitations."' 18 Prior
writing by this author" 9 has also concluded that section 733.702 is a statute
of nonclaim, although a contrary view is expressed by another author in the
same treatise.12 The reason Justice Grime's statement in Spohr seems to be
so uniformly ignored is because it is probably wrong; and,
in any case, it is
21
clearly dicta which is not binding on the appellate courts.1
As of this writing, the first, third, and Fourth District Courts of Appeal
have held that section 733.702122 in its present form is a statute of nonclaim.

118. Id. at 227 (referring to Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Read, 493
So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1986)) (finding that it is a statute of nonclaim, which is uniformly to the
contrary).
119. Kelley, ProbateLitigation, in PRACTICE UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE, supra note
48, at §§ 20.39-.40.
120. "It is the author's opinion that practitioners should continue to treat F.S. 733.702 as a
statute of limitations." L. Kathleen Horton-Brown, Creditor'sClaims and Family Allowance, in

§ 8.7 (1994).
121. Professor David T. Smith of the University of Florida Law School, in his treatise, states,
"Fla. Stat. § 733.702 now is ajurisdictional statute of nonclaim and not a statute of limitations as
it was at the time of Barnett Bank v. Estate of Read." FLORIDA PROBATE CODE MANUAL § 7.2
(Mitchie 1996).
122. Section 733.702, entitled Limitations on presentation of claims, provides:
(1) If not barred by s. 733.710, no claim or demand against the decedent's
estate that arose before the death of the decedent, including claims of the state
and any of its subdivisions, whether due or not, direct or contingent, or liquidated or unliquidated; no claim for funeral or burial expenses; no claim for personal property in the possession of the personal representative; and no claim for
damages, including, but not limited to, an action founded on fraud or another
wrongful act or omission of the decedent, is binding on the estate, on the personal representative, or on any beneficiary unless filed within the later of 3
months after the time of the first publication of the notice of administration or, as
to any creditor required to be served with a copy of the notice of administration,
30 days after the date of service of such copy of the notice on the creditor, even
though the personal representative has recognized the claim or demand by paying
a part of it or interest on it or otherwise. The personal representative may settle
in full any claim without the necessity of the claim being filed when the settlement has been approved by the beneficiaries adversely affected according to the
priorities provided in this code and when the settlement is made within the
statutory time for filing claims; or, within 3 months after the first publication of
the notice of administration, he may file a proof of claim of all claims he has paid
or intends to pay.
(2) No cause of action heretofore or hereafter accruing, including, but not
limited to, an action founded upon fraud or other wrongful act or omission, shall
survive the death of the person against whom the claim may be made, whether an
action is pending at the death of the person or not, unless the claim is filed within
the time periods set forth in this part.
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This line of cases began when Judge Smith writing for the First District
1 23
Court of Appeal in In re Estate of Parson
first characterized section
733.702, as amended in 1984, as a nonclaim statute. 124 This opinion preceded Spohr by more than a year. Judge Smith again writing for the court in
Thames v. Jackson,'25 reaffirmed this characterization after Spohr, without
mentioning Spohr.126 Judge Schwartz, writing for the First District Court of
Appeal in Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. v. Carter127 cited Parsons with
approval, but did not mention Spohr. However, the Baptist Hospital characterization of section 733.702, as a statute of nonclaim, was dicta, since the
issue before the court was the nature of section 733.710 as either a statute of
nonclaim or a statute of limitations. Finally, the Fourth District Court of
(3) Any claim not timely filed as provided in this section is barred even
though no objection to the claim is filed on the grounds of timeliness or otherwise unless the court extends the time in which the claim may be filed. Such an
extension may be granted only upon grounds of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient
notice of the claims period. No independent action or declaratory action may be
brought upon a claim which was not timely filed unless such an extension has
been granted. If the personal representative or any other interested person serves
on the creditor a notice to file a petition for an extension or be forever barred, the
creditor shall be limited to a period of 30 days from the date of service of the notice in which to file a petition for extension.
(4) Nothing in this section affects or prevents:
(a) A proceeding to enforce any mortgage, security interest, or other lien on
property of the decedent.
(b) To the limits of casualty insurance protection only, any proceeding to
establish liability of the decedent or the personal representative for which he is
protected by the casualty insurance.
(c) The filing of a claim by the Department of Revenue subsequent to the
expiration of the time for filing claims provided in subsection (1), provided it
does so file within 30 days after the service of the inventory by the personal representative on the department or, in the event an amended or supplementary inventory has been prepared, within 30 days after the service of the amended or
supplementary inventory by the personal representative on the department.
(d) The filing of a cross-claim or counterclaim against the estate in an action
instituted by the estate; however, no recovery on such a cross-claim or counterclaim shall exceed the estate's recovery in such an action.
(5) Nothing in this section shall extend the limitations period set forth in s.
733.710.
FLA. STAT. § 733.702 (1995).
123. 570 So. 2d 1125 (Fla 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990). "These changes ... indicate the legislature's intent to create a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim which, under the circumstances
specified in the statutes, automatically bars untimely claims." Id. at 1126 (footnote omitted).
124. Id.
125. 598 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
126. See id.
127. 658 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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Appeal fell in line with Comerica Bank & Trust, F.S.B., v. SDI Operating
Partners,L.P.,128 and found section 733.702 to be a statute of nonclaim.' 29 It
seems most likely when this issue reaches the supreme court that it will
retreat from its characterization of the statue in its current version as a
statute of limitations.
Regarding section 733.710,130 agreement is not uniform among the
districts in classifying that estate, with the Fourth District Court of Appeal
finding it to be a statute of non-claim and the Third District Court of Appeal
finding it to be a statute of limitations.
In Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. v. Carter, the hospital, a known
creditor of decedent, was advised by the widow that the decedent died
without any assets requiring probate administration. 131 However, the
hospital filed a creditor's caveat anyway. 132 Very shortly after the expiration
of a two year period following the decedent's death, the widow commenced
administration of the estate. 133 The hospital was notified of the administration by the court because of the caveat, and promptly filed its claim.' 34 The
as being barred by
personal representative/widow moved to strike the 13claim
5
section 733.710 and the trial court struck the claim.
The hospital appealed arguing that "733.710 is a statute of limitations,
rather than of repose, [and therefore] fraud or misrepresentation of the type
alleged here may serve to estop the estate from raising the limitations

128. 673 So. 2d 163 (Fla 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
129. Id. at 168.
130. Section 733.710 entitled Limitations on claims against estates, provides:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of the code, 2 years after the death
of a person, neither the decedent's estate, the personal representative (if any), nor
the beneficiaries shall be liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent, whether or not letters of administration have been issued, except as pro-

vided in this section.
(2) This section shall not apply to a creditor who has filed a claim pursuant
to s. 733.702 within 2 years after the person's death, and whose claim has not
been paid or otherwise disposed of pursuant to s. 733.705.
(3) This section shall not affect the lien of any duly recorded mortgage or
security interest or the lien of any person in possession of personal property or
the right to foreclose and enforce the mortgage or lien.
FLA.STAT. § 733.710(1)-(3) (1995).
131. Baptist Hosp., 658 So. 2d at 561.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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defense."' 136 The Third District Court of Appeal agreed and reversed and
remanded for a factual determination of the misrepresentation/estoppel
issue. 37 Had section 733.7 10 been a statute of repose (nonclaim statute), no
defense would have been available and the claim would have been finally
the opinion
barred. To illustrate a statute that operates with such finality,
8
pointed out that section 733.702 was such a statute of repose. 1
In direct and certified conflict is Comerica Bank & Trust, F.S.B. v. SDI
Operating Partners, L.P.139 The probate court, on motion, granted an
extension of time, beyond two years following decedent's death in which to
file its claim. 4° The personal representative appealed arguing that section
733.710 was a statute of repose and unequivocally erases any liability on
claims filed after the repose period.' 4 ' The Fourth District Court of Appeal
agreed and reversed. 42 The effect of this determination is that none of the
equitable defenses of fraud or estoppel are available to excuse noncompliance with the statute. The reasoning of the Fourth District Court of Appeal
is based on the fact that section 733.702, by its terms, is subordinate to
733.7 10.143 The court reasoned that if section 733.702 most likely is a
statute of repose (in this it agrees with the Third District Court of Appeal),
then section 733.710 which is preeminent, must also be a statute of repose,
and not a statute of limitations.
To its credit, the Fourth District Court of Appeal opinion in Comerica
Bank & Trust is the first opinion which makes note of the "throw-away" line
in Spohr v. Berryman which characterizes section 733.702 as a statute of
limitations. 144 As gently as possible, Judge Farmer writing for the Comerica

136. Baptist Hosp., 658 So. 2d at 561.

137. Id. at 561.
138. Id. at563.
139. Commerica Bank, 673 So. 2d at 163.
140. Id. at 164. There was no issue as to whether the claims were timely under section
733.702, since the period runs from service of notice of administration.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 163.
143. Section 733.702(1) begins: "If not barred by s. 733.710, no claim or demand against
Also, 733.702(5) provides:
." FLA. STAT. § 733.702(1) (1991).
the decedent's estate ....
"Nothing in this section shall extend the limitations period set forth in s. 733.710." Id. §
733.702(5). Finally, 733.710(1) begins: "Notwithstanding any other provision of the code ......
Id. § 733.710(1). The author agrees with the Fourth District Court of Appeal regarding
preeminence of 733.710, but disagrees that it be at of least equal authority with 733.702. Also,
the balance of the opinion is an intricately constructed model of logic, which rests on a faulty
foundation. It is the author's opinion that section 733.710 is an ordinary statute of limitations.
144. ComericaBank, 673 So. 2d at 166 n.5.
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court, points out that by the time Spohr was decided, section 733.702
had
45
been amended from a statute of limitations to a statute of nonclaim
Trying to make procedural sense of the unsettled state of the law
becomes difficult for the practitioner. Recognizing widespread disagreement, this author suggests the following:
1.(a) A claimant is not barred until the passage of two years from
decedent's death for failure to timely file a claim if he was reasonably
ascertainable but was not served with notice of administration. The claim
may be filed at any time during the two year period and it will be determined
timely. The better procedure for the claimant would be to file a motion to
extend the time for filing a claim on the authority of section 733.702(3) (on
the grounds of insufficient notice of the claims period) 146 so as not to have
the court mistakenly enter an order of discharge, without notice to the
claimant, believing the claim to have been barred without further action by
section 733.702(3).147 Section 733.710 is a statute of limitations, which
must be pled as an affirmative defense and by case law interpretation is
subject to the equitable defenses of fraud and estoppel.
1.(b) A claimant who has received notice of administration but who has
148
not timely filed the claim is automatically barred without further action
unless the claimant requests an extension of time to file, which may only be
granted on the ground of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims
period. 733.702(3).
2. The time for objection to a claim 149 may be extended by the court
before or after the thirty-day time period expires upon a showing of good
cause. This is a rule of judicial
procedure which may be relaxed in the broad
50
discretion of the trial court.
3. An independent action must be commenced by the claimant if the
claim has been objected to, within thirty-days from the date of service of the

145. Id. at 166.
146. This is probably not required for the validity of the filed claim, since the claim simply

has not been barred.
147. See Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
148. No motion to strike the claim is required.
149. On or before four months of the first publication of the notice of administration or 30
days from the filing of the claim, whichever is later. See FLA. STAT. § 733.705(2) (1995).
150. Golden v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 481 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1986). Although the court in Golden did not
construe the same portion of the present statute, it may be cited as authority for this proposition.
See also FLA. STAT. § 733.705(2).
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objection. This is a rule of judicial procedure which may be relaxed in the
broad discretion of the trial court for good cause shown.1 5'
V. TRUSTS
The law of trusts has seen substantial legislative action in the past three
years, especially as it relates to a trust where the settlor has reserved a power to
revoke. 52 Several significant legislative changes have occurred which impact
trusts.
The first, setting a method to determine reasonable attorneys' fees for
the trustee's attorney, was covered in detail above under the section on
attorneys' Fees and will not be further discussed here.
The second involves the "on to off' creditor's procedures imposed on
revocable trusts. The third creates a statute of limitations153 to mirror section
54
733.710 which is applicable to claims two years after the settlor's death.
The fourth involves new execution requirements for trusts with testamentary
aspects. Finally, several trust cases were discussed above in the section on
Jurisdiction.
In the 1993 survey, Ms. Donohue noted that an effect of the recent
legislation "was to make trust administration more similar to probate
administration."'' 55 In fact, the provisions adopted in chapter 93-257, relating
151. See FLA. STAT. § 733.705(4); see also Yerex v. Durzo, 651 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1995).
152. The statutory references in several places throughout the code are to "a trust described
in s. 733.707(3)." That section provides:
(3) Any portion of a trust with respect to which a decedent who is the grantor has at the decedent's death a right of revocation, as defined in paragraph(c),
either alone or in conjunction with any other person, is liable for the expenses of
the administration of the decedent's estate and enforceable claims of the decedent's creditors to the extent the decedent's estate is insufficient to pay them as
provided in § 733.607(2).
FLA. STAT. § 733.707(3) (1995) (emphasis added). The further reference "as defined in
paragraph (c)" is an erroneous reference, as paragraph (3)(c) notes:
(c) This subsection shall not impair any rights an individual has under a
qualified domestic relations order as that term is defined in s. 414(p) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
Id. § 733.707(3)(c). The correct paragraph (c) was omitted through legislative error. Although
the error was created in ch. 95-401, it was not corrected in the 1996 Legislative session.
153. Or a statute of repose, depending on whether you are in the fourth district. See discussion supra p. 407.
154. FLA. STAT. § 737.306(4).
155. Donohue, supra note 1, at 383.
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to creditors' rights in trust assets and trustees' liability to creditors, was the
Ms. Donohue also
first step in a trend toward requiring probate of trusts. 1 56
attractive
less
trusts
such
"[make]
would
noted that this
Apparently her warnings did not go unheeded. Chapter 95-401 began
reversing that process. The philosophy behind this was that if the public
desired a probate of the estate, that was now available through the use of a
will as a testamentary document. Why should we labor to build a parallel
system to probate trusts when the existing will probate system has evolved
and been refined over many years and is well suited to its purpose. In fact, it
was the intention of many people to avoid probate which motivated the use
of the living trust as a testamentary vehicle. It was unfair and unreasonable
to force the living trust into a probate process.
However, it was also unfair and unreasonable to allow persons to avoid
their just debts, either during lifetime or upon death, by using a revocable
trust as a testamentary alternative to a will. Therefore, the statutory duty of
the trustee to be responsible ultimately to see to the payment of just debts of
the decedent was retained, but in a revised format.
Specifically, the 1993 version of section 737.3056, "[t]rustee's duty to
pay expenses and obligations of settlor's estate," was repealed, as was the
1993 version of section 737.3057, entitled "[tirustee's duty to notice creditors," by chapter 95-401, sections 41 and 42, respectively, effective October
1, 1995. Adopted by chapter 95-401, section 737.3054, entitled "[t]rustee's
duty to pay expenses and obligations of settlor's estate," replaced the prior
statute so the trustee's duty and liability to creditors of the decedent remains
in the statute.'57
Some have described it as a legislative oversight that the trustee's duty
to pay creditors (and expenses of administration of the settlor's estate) under
the conditions described in the statute continues, but no provision for the
trustee to bar creditor's claims remains. This is an accurate analysis of the
present state of the law, however, it was accomplished intentionally rather
than by oversight. If the legislature was to keep the faith with those who
assumed that their revocable trust would avoid probate, and intended it to be
so, it needed to remove the "probate vestige," the creditor's publication and
claim filing procedure from the trust law, which it did. That should not,
however, shelter the trustee or the trust assets from just debts of the decedent, unless those debts are paid by, or extinguished through, a probate
estate.
156. IM.
157. FLA. STAT. § 737.3054(1995). See also id.§ 733.707(3).
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So what is the present state of the law? In the absence of a concurrent
probate proceeding, the trustee is well advised to determine and pay the
settlor's just debts from the trust assets. If there are disputed claims,
dissident beneficiaries, challenges to the trust validity by omitted heirs, or
other adversarial matters to which procedural solutions are not provided in
the trust statutes, then a concurrent probate administration of the estate is the
solution. Assuming none of these items are present, an "informal administration" of the trust alone is required.
The alternative would be to erect a complex procedural structure in the
trust law, identical to that in probate, to resolve these issues for trusts. This
cannot be what is desired by the public.
A practical problem which exists because of the implementation of this
"informal trust administration" concept is that the designated trustee may
have no authority to pay claims directly to the claimants. The statute does
not authorize the trustee to make direct payments of creditors. That authority, if it exists, could only come from the governing instrument, the trust.
Certainly 99.9% of the trust documents presently in place do not allow the
trustee that authority. What results is that the payments are either made with
the formal or informal consents of all beneficiaries, or a concurrent probate
is initiated. The former solution should prevail in most of the trust administrations where the plan benefits only a surviving spouse, or the spouse and
children. In the latter instance, the procedures of the statute158 will operate
to provide the structure to accomplish the desired result, that being payment
of the settlor' s just debts. The trustee is now defined as an interested person
in the probate administration' 59 and would, therefore, have the right to
petition for administration.' 60
A part of the new concept of a trust's responsibility for payment of the
just debts of the decedent, is the necessity that the trust and the trustee
become known to the creditors or to the personal representative. This is
by requiring the trustee to file a notice of trust with the
accomplished
16 1
clerk.

158. See generallyid. § 737.3054.
159. Id. § 731.201(21).
160. l § 733.202(1).
161. See ch. 95-401, § 4, 1995 Fla. Laws 3275, 3281 (adopting FLA. STAT. § 737.308
(1995). Section 737.308 provides:
(1) Upon the death of a settlor of a trust described in s. 733.707(3), the
trustee must file a notice of trust with the court of the county of the settlor's
domicile and the court having jurisdiction of the settlor's estate.
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That notice is indexed by the clerk in the manner of a caveat if no probate
proceeding is then pending, or is filed in the probate file with a copy sent by
the clerk to the personal representative if such a proceeding is then pending.
The structure of this procedure provided by statute is that the personal
representative (who is aware of the trust and the trustee by virtue of the
notice of trust which was filed and served as required in 737.308(4)) will
certify in writing to the trustee the estate's shortfall after the residuary of the
probate estate (or in case of intestacy, all assets other than statutory entitlements, such as family allowance) has been consumed. Note that preresiduary devises and statutory entitlements are protected. 62 The trustee, after
reserving sufficient sums to pay the expenses of trust administration,
including fees of the trustee and the trustee's attorney, remits amounts
sufficient to fund the personal representative's certification. A settlor in the
trust document may provide for the manner in which the remittitur is
apportioned within the trust among the various interests, but absent specification in the trust document, the statute creates the schedule of apportionment.
Most lawyers have assumed that the concurrent probate administration,
with its published notice of administration and required service on known or
reasonably ascertainable creditors, will also bar the rights of creditors in the
trust assets and extinguish the liability of the trustee for payment (before the
two year statute of limitations expires); however, some have questioned this
(2) The notice of trust must contain the name of the settlor, the settlor's date
of death, the title of the trust, if any, the date of the trust, and the name and address of the trustee.
(3) If the settlor's probate proceeding has been commenced, the clerk must
notify the trustee in writing of the date of the commencement of the probate proceeding and the file number.
(4) The clerk shall file and index the notice of trust in the same manner as a
caveat, unless there exists a probate proceeding for the settlor's estate in which
case the notice of trust must be filed in the probate proceeding and the clerk shall
send a copy to the personal representative.
(5) In any proceeding affecting the expenses of the administration of the estate, or any claims described in s. 733.702(1), the trustee of a trust described in s.
733.707(3) is an interested person in the administration of the grantor's estate.
(6) Any proceeding affecting the expenses of the administration of the estate
or any claims described in s. 733.702(l) prior to the trustee filing a notice of trust
are binding upon the trustee.
(7) The trustee's failure to file the notice of trust does not affect the trustee's
obligation to pay expenses of administration and enforceable claims as provided
in s. 733.607(2).

FLA.

STAT.

§ 737.308 (1995).

162. Id § 733.607(2) (1995).
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result. The operative statute 16 provides: "no claim or demand against the
decedent's estate ... is binding on the personal representative, or on any
after the time of the first
beneficiary unless filed within the later of 3''months
64
publication of the notice of administration.
An amendment to this statute is being considered by the probate law
committee of the RPPTL section to add specific reference to the trust, trustee,
and trust beneficiaries in this section.
Another significant legislative change which must be considered by the
practitioner in drafting living trusts is chapter 95-401, specifically section
11, which later became section 737.111.165 This statute reversed the holding
in Zuckerman v. Alter 166 to the effect that a trust of personal property
(specifically stocks and a bank account), which included post-death dispositions, did not require witnesses as a condition of validity.' 67 Under the terms
of the new statute, the testamentary aspects of an express trust, as defined in
section 731.201(33), are invalid unless the trust is executed with the formalities required by section 732.502168 for execution of a will. The compel-

163. Id. § 733.702 (1995).
164. Id. (emphasis added).
165. Section 737.111 of the FloridaStatutes is entitled "Execution requirements for express
trusts" and provides:
(1) The testamentary aspects of a trust defined in s. 731.201(33), are invalid
unless the trust is executed with the formalities required for the execution of a
will.
(2) The testamentary aspects of a trust created by a nonresident are not invalid because the trust does not meet the requirements of this section, if the trust is
valid under the laws of the state or country where the settlor was at the time of
execution.
(3) The testamentary aspects of an amendment to a trust are invalid unless
the amendment is executed with the same formalities as a will.
(4) For the purposes of this section, the term "testamentary aspects" means
those provisions of the trust that dispose of the trust property on the death of the
settlor other than to the settlor's estate.
FLA. STAT. § 737.111 (1995).
166. 615 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1993). See Donohue, supra note 1, at 376 (providing additional
discussion on this case).
167. Trusts of real property have always required execution with the formalities of a deed,
requiring two witnesses, as a condition to validity. FLA. STAT. §§ 689.01, .05, .06 (1995).
However, the formalities required for execution of deed differ from the formalities required for
execution of a will, even though both require two witnesses.
168. See section 732.502 which provides that every will must be in writing and executed as
follows:
(1)(a) Testator's signature.1. The testator must sign the will at the end; or
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ling question, especially as it relates to self-trusteed trusts, is why should one
be able to make a deathtime disposition of property by a trust, without
witnesses present and subscribing, while that same disposition, if done by
will, would require present and subscribing witnesses. Witnesses should be

required in both or neither. The consensus is that the dignity and formality
added to the event, together with the potential for later eye witness testimony, mandates the presence of witnesses. Because of the definitional
breadth in section 731.201(33),169 all of the popular forms of split interest
trusts and the qualified personal residence trust 170 are caught within the
scope of this execution requirement.
The drafting oversight is that existing trusts were not excluded from the
operation of this section. While revocable or amendable trusts may cure the
problem with an amendment or revocation, the real problem lies in existing
trusts which are neither revocable or amendable. The argument may be
7
made by testate or residuary beneficiaries of the decedent's probate estate,' '
that application of the statute to existing qualified charitable remainder
trusts, or pooled income funds created in the trust form, invalidate the post
death disposition provisions. Moreover, these trust assets are properly assets
2. The testator's name must be subscribed at the end of the will by some
other person in the testator's presence and by his direction.
(b) Witnesses.-The testator's:
1. Signing, or
2. Acknowledgment:
a. That he has previously signed the will, or
b. That another person has subscribed the testator's name to it, must be in
the presence of at least two attesting witnestes.
(c) Witnesses' signatures.-Theattesting witnesses must sign the will in the
presence of the testator and in the presence of each other.
(2) Any will, other than a holographic or nuncupative will, executed by a
nonresident of Florida, either before or after this law takes effect, is valid as a
will in this state if valid under the laws of the state or country where the testator
was at the time of execution. A will in the testator's handwriting that has been
executed in accordance with subsection (1) shall not be considered a holographic
will.
(3) No particular form of words is necessary to the validity of a will if it is
executed with the formalities required by law.
(4) A codicil shall be executed with the same formalities as a will.
FLA. STAT. § 732.502 (1995).
169. Section 731.201(33) provides that, "'[t]rust"' means an express trust, private or charitable, with additions to it, wherever and however created. It also includes a trust created or
determined by a judgment or decree under which the trust is to be administered in the manner of
an express trust." FLA. STAT. § 731.201(33) (1995).
170. To the extent of any testamentary aspects.
171. Or perhaps by the IRS.
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subject to the residuary clause of the grantor/settlor's will, or to be inherited
by beneficiaries of the intestate grantor/settlor. Assuming, however, these
trusts are of the nature of contracts, then retroactive application of this
statute is constitutionally defective as impairing the right to contract. This
deficiency was recognized after the passage of chapter 95-401, however,
since no legislation of any consequence in the trusts and estates area passed
during the 1996 Legislative session, this oversight was not corrected.
Chapter 95-401 added several new trust administration aspects which
create a power in the trustee to hold new additions to the trust as a separate
trust, or incorporate them into the trust, and also creates a right to sever an
existing trust. 172 These powers are granted principally to avoid tax consequences involving the generation skipping tax. 173 In the first instance, if a
devise is made to an existing exempt generation skipping trust, whether one
which is grandfathered as exempt, or one which was created as exempt, by
keeping the new assets separate, a taint of the existing trust will be avoided.
In the second instance, this will allow a fiduciary, absent documentary
authority, to divide a trust which might have an inclusion ratio' 74 of greater
than zero and less than one into two identical trusts, one having an inclusion
ratio of zero and the other of one. This will facilitate 75administration and will
affect taxable distributions and taxable terminations.'
VI. GUARDIANSHIPS
With a court order, a guardian may exercise certain defined powers
regarding trusts held by the ward in a fiduciary capacity. 176 In In re Guardian-

172. See FLA. STAT. § 737.402(2)(c) (1995). The court is also granted authority to order
severance or combination of trust. FLA. STAT. § 737.403 (1995).
173. See I.R.C. § 2613 (1995).
174. Id.
175. Id§§ 2612, 2621.
176. See FLA. STAT. § 744.441 (1995). This section entitled Powers of guardian upon
court approval provides:
(1) After obtaining approval of the court pursuant to a petition for authorization to act, a plenary guardian of the property, or a limited guardian of the
property within the powers granted by the order appointing the guardian or an
approved annual or amended guardianship report, may:
(2) Execute, exercise, or release any powers as trustee, personal representative, custodian for minors, conservator, or donee of any power of appointment or
other power that the ward might have lawfully exercised, consummated, or exe-
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ship of Muller,177 the guardian who was the decedent's son, wanted to remove
the serving trustee of the decedent's preexisting revocable trust on the grounds
of conflict of interest. There was pending litigation between the guardian on
behalf of the ward and the person who was serving as trustee of the trust. The
equities were clearly with the guardian, but the trial judge "with reluctance"
denied the petition finding that the statutes
relied upon by the movants did not
78
contain the authority to remove a trustee.1
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in a per curiam opinion from a panel
of senior judges construed the language of section 744.441(2) providing "or
other power" to include the power a ward reserved to amend his own trust.
This construction ignores the well established rule of statutory and document
construction, ejusdem generis, which provides that a general reference following a specific list is to be construed as limited by the types of items in the
specific list.179 In this instance, all the powers referred to are powers held in a
fiduciary capacity.' 8 0 That rule of construction would require the reference to
"other power" to be interpreted as, "other fiduciary power." In this instance,
the reserved power of the ward was a personal power as grantor, to amend his
trust. It is curious that if there was an actual present conflict of interest
between the trustee and the ward, that the circuit court, in a proceeding brought
under section 737.201(1)(a), which gives the court specific power to "[a]ppoint
or remove a trustee," 81' would not have done so.
Another Fourth District Court of Appeal case decided one year later
I
also addresses section 744.441. 82
In In re Guardianshipof Sherry,8 3 the
court would not permit a circuit judge to allow a guardian to create a trust
for the ward so as to change the ultimate beneficiary of the ward's estate
because it would not result in any tax savings.184 As the court stated, there is
no reason to negate the general principal that a guardian cannot exercise a
cuted if not incapacitated, if the best interest of the ward requires such execution,
exercise, or release.

(19) Create revocable or irrevocable trusts of property of the ward's estate
which may extend beyond the disability or life of the ward in connection with
estate, gift, income, or other tax planning or in connection with estate planning.
Id § 744.441(1), (2), (19).
177. 650 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
178. Id at 699.
179. See generallyMetropolis Publishing Co. v. Lee, 170 So. 442 (Fla. 1936).
180. Except the reference to a power of appointment, which is a personal power.
181. FLA. STAT. § 737.201(1)(a) (1995).
182. See FLA. STAT. § 744.441(19).
183. 668 So. 2d 659 (Fla 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
184. Id. at 660.
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purely personal right of the ward. I8 5 In this case, the ward, Ruth, and her
husband, George, were the co-grantors of a joint revocable trust. That trust
provided for disposition of its assets on the death of both grantors to Harold
and his wife, George's son and daughter-in-law. At the time of the guardianship adjudication, Ruth and George were in dissolution proceedings. The
guardianship court approved an agreement between the guardian and George
(who was the trustee of the trust) to distribute one-half of the family assets
by means of a distributions of the corpus of the trust to Ruth's guardian.
Harold and his wife did not approve the agreement.
Ruth's guardian received the distribution of assets, but Ruth's existing
will poured her assets on death back into the trust. The guardian petitioned
to create a new trust for Ruth into which the funds would be placed, which
provided testamentary disposition to Ruth's friends. George objected and
the court held:
the trial court erred in approving Appellee's petition to create a
trust that would change the ultimate beneficiary of Ruth's estate
from Harold and his wife to Fields, as it is clear that doing so had
nothing to do with either tax or estate planning, as authorized under
the statute. No benefits will accrue to the estate as a result of the
guardian's substituting his judgment
of what the ward would do
186
now if she were not incapacitated.
There is another interesting line of cases which limits fees that are
charged and collected by close family members for guardianship services. In
one such case, a mother became a guardian for her daughter and was the
recipient of a medical malpractice settlement of $2.85 million on behalf of her
daughter. 8 7 An estrangement later developed between the mother and her now
adult daughter, which resulted in removal of the mother as guardian and
restoration of some of the rights of the ward. As a part of her removal, the
mother/guardian applied for the award of guardian's fees. The court in In re
Guardianshipof Neher held:
a daughter is not entitled to compensation as a guardian of the person of her mother for doing what a daughter does. In re Read v.
Kenefick, 555 So.2d 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). There is also no
reason that a mother should be entitled to compensation for doing

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. In re Guardianship of Neher, 659 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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what a mother does. In this case, however, not all of Sharon Neher's actions were actions that are normally done by a mother, and
she should have received compensation for those services that were
not. This ruling constitutes a holding that Sharon Neher preformed
some compensable services for the guardianship. Sharon Neher
established a guardianship for her daughter, filed annual accountings, performed other services that were beyond the duties of a
mother, and successfully thwarted an attempt to terminate the
guardianship.
Therefore, she should be compensated for some
18 8
services.
Another interesting case, which follows a developing line of authority is
Wright v. Departmentof Health and Rehabilitative Services. 189 Ms. Wright, a
professional guardian, was removed from all guardianships on a finding of
probable cause by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
("HRS") that "she had exploited her wards by improper management of
funds."' 19° The statute requires that the guardian "file with the court a true,
complete, and final report of [her] guardianship within twenty days after [her]
removal." 19' Ms. Wright refused to do so claiming her fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. The court held her in contempt for refusal
to comply with its order and ordered her incarcerated until compliance.' 92 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal made an extensive review of the law from
other states, and federal jurisdictions, and concluded that by accepting her
fiduciary position, with its requirement to account, that Ms. Wright waived193her
future right not to incriminate herself by fulfilling those incumbent duties.
The issue of standing in a guardianship matter is one not well defined in
the statutes. Persons who allege that they are "relatives and beneficiaries
under the ward's will" and who were taking care of the ward before she was
declared incapacitated are interested persons under Rule 5.700(a) of the
FloridaProbateRules, and have standing to object to a final
accounting and
194
ward.
deceased
a
of
guardian
the
of
discharge
for
petition

188. Id. at 1297.

189. 668 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
190. Id. at 662.
191. See FLA. STAT. § 744.511 (1995).
192. Id. at 662.
193. Id. at 662-63.
194. Bachinger v. SunBank/South Florida, N.A. 675 So. 2d 186, 186 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996).
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If they do not have a sufficient interest to question how her funds
were spent, there is probably no one who does, and we do not think
that should be the case. As Judge Sharp observed in SunBank and
Trust Co. v. Jones, "[c]ourts must scrupulously oversee the handling of the affairs of incompetent persons under their jurisdiction
' 95
and err on the side of over-supervising rather than indifference."'
dissent follows McGinnis v. Kanevsky holding to the
Judge Glickstein's
19 6
contrary.

Finally, in Lawyers Surety Corp. v. Saltz, a surcharge action, the court
found that the burden of proof of improper expenditures was with the
plaintiff and that the plaintiff had failed to meet that burden. 197 The guardian
had paid $3,000 per month to the ward's wife for eight months for the care
of the ward. The allowance was deposited by the ward's wife into a joint
account from which her personal expenses were also paid. The guardian did
not require or obtain any accounting from the wife for the expenditures. The
court found that the plaintiff failed to carry the burden of proof to show that
damaged by this admittedly improper disbursethe guardianship had 1been
98
guardian.
the
by
ment
VII. ELECTIVE SHARE
In 1994, the Third District Court of Appeal decided an important elective
share case entitled, Friedberg v. SunBank/Miami, N.A. 199 The widow petitioned to take an elective share against the assets of a revocable intervivos
trust created by the decedent two years prior to death. The marriage was a
thirty-eight year marriage. The total value of the estate exceeded $7,000,000
of which all but about $250,000 was funded in the decedent's revocable trust
at the time of his death. The trust provided for the majority of the estate to
pass outright to charity, with a small portion to remain in trust in order to
generate income for the widow during her lifetime. The opinion suggests
that the trust was created and intended "to diminish or eliminate a surviving

195. Id. at 188 (quoting SunBank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 645 So. 2d 1008, 1017 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
196. Id. (Glickstein, J., dissenting) (following McGinnis v. Kanesky, 564 So. 2d 1141
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
197. 658 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 2nd Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
198. ld. at 1152-53.
199. 648 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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spouse's statutory elective share." 2°° The opinion noted that the legislature
had considered and rejected adoption of the "augmented estate" concept in
the Uniform Probate Code, which includes in the elective share right the
value of assets not subject to probate, but over which the decedent exercised
ownership or control; in this case the value of the revocable trust would have
been included under that provision of the Uniform Probate Code.
The court was troubled by this result and indicated:
[w]e must point out, however, that we are troubled by this result.
This case involves a long term, intact marriage. We find it strange
that a divorced spouse is entitled under section 61.075, Florida
Statutes, to reach assets held in a revocable, inter vivos trust, but a
loving, devoted spouse is not.... Indeed, the amicus brief stated
that a citizen has "a constitutional right to be a mean-spirited, no
good curmudgeon" and that there are no "statutory impediments to
developing an estate plan that cuts out the spouse." Although we
believe this to be a manifestly unfair result and poor public policy,
the
we recognize that we are not the appropriate forum to20correct
1
same. We encourage the legislature to revisit the issue.
The admonition in the opinion for the legislature to revisit the issue was
prophetic because, while the court was deciding this issue, a special committee
of the RPPTL section was drafting proposed legislation which would reverse
the Friedbergresult by adoption of a hybrid version 2° of the augmented estate
concept. A motivating factor for this revision was a different situation similar
to Friedberg,whereby, a well know trusts and estates lawyer who died in 1993
created and funded a revocable living trust before his death to deprive his
widow in a very long term marriage of any interest in his estate. Under the
proposed legislation, Mrs. Friedberg would have had an entitlement to forty

200. Ma at 205 (citation omitted).
201. Id. at 206.
202. The current version of the augmented estate in the Uniform Probate Code includes not
only the decedent's probate and nonprobate estate in the calculation, but also includes the
surviving spouse's net personal estate (including certain nonprobate transfers to others and
reduced by "enforceable claims" against the surviving spouse) in the calculation, first "grossing
up" all the family property, then considering the wife's net personal assets as being first funded in
satisfaction of the elective share. U.P.C. § 2-207. If there remains a deficiency, then assets of the
decedent's estate are used to satisfy the "short fall." In the Florida modification, the surviving
spouse's assets (and obligations) are neither counted in the original pool, nor in the funding
formula. This was a concession to simplicity at the expense of perfect equity.
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percent of the value of the assets of the revocable living trust, with a partial
credit for the value of the income trust created for her.
In reality, the elective share is a right only available to spouses of
decedents who do not have good legal advice on the ease with which it may
be avoided. If there is a public policy in this state to prevent total disinheritance of a spouse, the law should be amended so it accomplish its intended
result; if not, it should be repealed.
After several years of intensive work, the special elective share committee 2°3 reported proposed legislation to the executive counsel, which
approved the recommendation and this was introduced in the 1996 Legislature as House Bill 2157. This bill was not reported out of the committee on
either the house or the senate side and did not receive action during 1996. It
will be reintroduced again in 1997.
VIII. JoINT BANK AccouNTs

The topic of joint and survivorship bank accounts has remained active in
the case law since the last survey, and remains both unsettled, conflicting, and
confusing.
A difficult concept is the effect of creation of a joint account with right
of survivorship as it relates to creation of an immediate ownership in the
funds deposited by the non-depositing joint tenant. This arises in the context
of the effect on a non-withdrawing joint tenant's rights when another joint
tenant withdraws the proceeds in the account. The Third District Court of
Appeal has held that, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary,
creation of a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship presumed the immediate creation of ownership rights by present gift in the non-contributing
tenant(s), and that interest survives withdrawal by another tenant. 204 This
view is based on cases which found the immediate creation of an interest in
the joint tenant, so as to avoid difficulty with the failure to comply with the
statute of wills. The theory was that the statute of wills required that
testamentary dispositions of property only occur if the instrument complied
with the requirements for execution of a will. Bank signature cards, although providing for survivorship, did not comply. Therefore, before
appropriate changes to the statutes, the only way courts could validate the
survivorship provisions in signature cards was to find that a gift of the
203. The author served as a member of this Committee.
204. De Soto v. Guardianship of De Soto, 664 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
Hagopian v. Zimmer, 653 So. 2d 474 (Fla 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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account occurred at its creation. Some of the old cases discussed the fact
that the surviving joint tenant was in possession of the passbook, evidencing
the "donor's" intent to make a present gift.2 5 That fiction is unnecessary
under the present statutory provisions 206 and the old cases which found the
legal fiction of a present gift in order to validate the survivorship rights are
no longer required.20 7 However, they are still being cited, and in the Third
District Court of Appeal, are still good law.
However, in Katz v. Katz,208 where the contributing joint tenant withdrew the funds from the joint account and purchased securities in his own
name, the Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected the argument of his
surviving spouse that, following his death, the securities belonged to her
since the funds used to purchase the securities had been joint funds. 20 In the
third district, the funds would have resulted in an immediate gift to the noncontributing spouse, and she would have been entitled to at least one-half of
the securities, since it was presumably her funds (by gift) which were used to
purchase that one-half. The better reasoned view is that there is no immediate gift upon deposit and that the interest of the non-contributing joint tenant
or tenants is only created by the survivorship provisions of the account and
only comes into possession after the death of the contributing tenant.
There is also some case law suggesting that such accounts may be
owned by the entireties, if the joint tenants are also husband and wife. 10
This concept is sometimes applied to bank accounts to shelter them from
lifetime third party creditor claims of one tenant. However, the concept is
native to real property interests and does not fit well when applied to
personal property ownership. Since an entireties interest cannot be severed
without the consent of both spouses, one characteristic of such a bank
account is that neither spouse can withdraw funds from the account without
the consent of the other. In practice, this would require two signatures on
each check or withdrawal order.

205. See generally Spark v. Canny, 88 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1956); Chase Federal Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Sullivan, 127 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1960).
206. See ch. 92-303, § 48, 1992 Fla. Laws 2739, 2788 (creating FLA. STAT. § 655.79 (Supp.
1992) (effective July 3, 1992)).
207. See In re Estate of Combee, 601 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 1992); In re Guardianship of Medley, 573 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990), causedismissed, 629 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1993).
208. 666 So. 2d 1025 (Fla 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 675 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 1996).
209. Id. at 1027.
210. Sitomer v. Orlan 660 So. 2d 141 (Fla 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).

Published by NSUWorks, 1996

43

Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 10

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 21:385

IX. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY
1995 was an important legislative year for powers of attorney. Section 17
of chapter 95-401 substantially reworded section 709.08, entitled "Durable
power of attorney. ''21 This was another piece of important legislation which
had been drafted by a special committee 21 2 of the RPPTL section, and which
had previously been introduced, but failed to pass.
Among the changes brought by this amendment was to allow "a
financial institution as defined in chapter 655, with trust powers, having a
place of business in this state and authorized to conduct trust business in this
state" to serve as an attorney in fact. If a petition to adjudicate incapacity of
the principal is filed, notice of the petition must be served on each know
attorney in fact. This is because adjudication will suspend the power of
attorney unless the guardianship court orders otherwise.
One of the most important aspects of the new statute is the authority of
third parties to rely on the power of attorney until notice of revocation is
received. The principal must hold each third party harmless from any loss or
liability suffered as a result of actions taken at the direction of the attorney in
fact. It also authorizes the third party to require the attorney in fact to
execute and deliver an affidavit stating that the principal is not deceased, a
petition to determine incapacity is not pending, that the principal has not
been adjudicated incapacitated, and has not revoked the power. A statutory
form of the affidavit is provided.
However, what makes the law work, is a provision which allows for
assessment of attorneys' fees against any third party who unreasonably
refuses the directions of an attorney in fact pursuant to the power. It had
been a very common practice for banks and stock brokers to decline to
accept instructions of an attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of
attorney. In practice, that now appears to be the exception rather than the
rule so long as the power of attorney is executed after October 1, 1995 and
pursuant to the amended statute. In fact, although prior powers continue to
be valid, to gain the protection and expanded scope of the new law, the
power must be executed after October 1, 1995.
Another provision of the new law which should give pause to prospective attorneys in fact, is that the attorney is charged as a fiduciary who must
observe the standards of care applicable to trustees. Also, the attorney in
fact is liable to interested persons if the power is exercised improperly. The
211. See FLA. STAT. § 709.08 (1995) (effective Oct. 1, 1995).
212. The author served as a member of this committee.
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prevailing party in an action under this provision is entitled to award of
attorneys' fees. In the case of multiple attorneys in fact, each is required to
attempt to prevent a breach of the fiduciary obligations by the other or
others.
X.

CONCLUSION

It is not only the tax laws which are continuously in a state of change that
need to be of concern to the trusts and estates lawyer, it is the changes in
substantive state law and applicable state procedure. An up-to-date lawyer is
as important to the practice in this substantive area as an up-to-date judge.
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